

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

ZACHARY R. CHERTOK,)	
ELIOT JOKELSON,)	
residents and taxpayers of the)	
City of Medford,)	
)	CASE NO. ____
Plaintiffs,)	Jury Trial Requested
v.)	
)	
CITY OF MEDFORD,)	
MEDFORD CITY COUNCIL,)	
BREANNA LUNGO-KOEHN,)	
in their official capacities,)	
)	
Defendants.)	

VERIFIED COMPLAINT
FOR DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

INTRODUCTION

1. This is a municipal taxpayer action challenging the legality of a recently enacted ordinance the Values-Aligned Local Investments Ordinance (the “Ordinance”) requiring or directing the City of Medford to divest public funds from specified categories of companies, including but not limited to weapons manufacturers, fossil fuel companies, private prison operators, and entities alleged to engage in “human rights violations.”

2. The Ordinance exceeds the municipality’s lawful authority, conflicts with Massachusetts investment and fiduciary statutes, interferes with federal foreign policy, and exposes municipal funds to unlawful management.

3. Plaintiffs seek declaratory and injunctive relief to prevent the unlawful expenditure, management, and diversion of municipal funds.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

1. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a)(2), as the matter in controversy arises under the laws of the United States, including Article VI, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution (Supremacy Clause) and 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (Federal Declaratory Judgment Act).

2. Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367, this Court has supplemental jurisdiction over the state claims, including G.L. c. 231A (Massachusetts Declaratory Judgment Act), G.L. c. 214, and its inherent equitable powers, are “so related” to the federal claims that they form part of the same constitutional case or controversy under Article III.

3. Venue is proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claims occurred in this district, including that Defendants are municipal entities located within this county and the challenged Ordinance was enacted and will be implemented here.

PARTIES

4. Plaintiff Zachary R. Chertok is a resident, property owner, and municipal taxpayer of the City of Medford.

5. Plaintiff Eliot Jokelson is a resident, property owner, and municipal taxpayer of the City of Medford.

6. Defendant City of Medford is a municipal corporation organized under the laws of the Commonwealth.

7. Defendant Medford City Council is the legislative body that enacted the Ordinance.

8. Defendant Mayor Breanna Lungo-Koehn is responsible for execution and implementation of municipal investment policy.

9. Plaintiffs bring this action in their capacity as municipal taxpayers.

10. Massachusetts law recognizes taxpayer standing to challenge ultra vires municipal action, ordinances exceeding statutory or constitutional authority, or illegal expenditure or management of public funds.

11. The Ordinance runs afoul of all three, as the City purports to take action that falls far outside of its ambit and in excess of its legal authority, and mandates or compels the unlawful management of municipal funds, conferring standing on Plaintiffs without the need to show individualized pecuniary loss.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND

12. On or about August 5, 2025, the City enacted the Ordinance, entitled “Values-Aligned Local Investments Ordinance.”

13. The Ordinance requires or directs municipal officials and/or boards to divest current holdings and refrain from future investment in companies falling within specified prohibited categories.

14. The Ordinance—which would direct the city to divest funds from entities involved in fossil fuels, weapons manufacturing, and supposed human rights violations—was passed in third reading in September but was vetoed on or about October 13, 2025, by Mayor Breanna Lungo-Koehn, who cited legal and financial concerns. The Medford City Counsel overrode the veto in a 6–1 vote on or about November 12, 2025.

15. The Ordinance applies to general municipal funds, trust or reserve funds, and, by its terms or effect, may reach pension or quasi-pension assets.

16. In pertinent part, Section D of the Ordinance provides that the City is prohibited from investing in

any company or entity that is directly, knowingly and over time contributing to severe violations of human rights and international humanitarian law as determined by international legal and humanitarian bodies and conventions including the United Nations, including, but not limited to, complicity in killings, physical abuse, displacement or other rights violations, confinement, forced labor, human rights violations based on racial, gender or LGBTQ+ identity, war crimes, crimes against

humanity, apartheid, genocide, ethnic cleansing, and illegal occupation, and complicity with such actions by governments or other parties.

17. The Ordinance’s criteria for which companies would be disqualified are vague and subjective. Nowhere does the Ordinance define its terms, including “contributing,” “complicity,” “severe violations of human rights.”

18. The Ordinance requires divestment from, refusal to deposit funds with, or mandatory withdrawal from certain financial institutions and entities based on non-financial, ideological criteria, without regard to the City’s financial needs.

Federal Preemption

19. The United States Constitution commits the conduct of foreign relations exclusively to the federal government.

20. Specifically, Article VI, Clause 2 of the U.S. Constitution, known as the Supremacy Clause, declares: “This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.”

21. State and local laws that target foreign nations or entities, touch on international disputes, or seek to impose economic sanctions, boycotts, or divestment based on foreign policy objectives, are preempted even in the absence of a directly conflicting federal statute.

22. Indeed, Congress has enacted a comprehensive federal sanctions regime, administered by the Executive Branch, governing when and how economic sanctions may be imposed on foreign states, entities, and individuals.

23. A municipal divestment ordinance that conditions the placement or retention of public funds on a foreign nation's conduct, or on a financial institution's relationships with foreign governments or entities, constitutes an impermissible intrusion into the federal foreign-affairs power.

24. Even where federal law does not mandate engagement with a particular foreign entity, the absence of federal sanctions reflects a deliberate federal policy choice that local governments may not countermand.

25. The Ordinance targets conduct with substantial foreign policy implications, including alleged "complicity" or "contribution" to "human rights violations" abroad.

26. In *Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council*, 530 U.S. 363 (2000), the Supreme Court struck down a Massachusetts statute restricting state purchases from companies doing business with Burma (Myanmar), finding preempted state and local divestment regimes that interfere with federal foreign policy.

27. The Ordinance is similarly preempted, as its purpose and effect are to influence foreign conduct through economic coercion, thereby impermissibly intruding into an area reserved exclusively to the federal government.

28. The Ordinance creates inconsistent or fragmented sanctions across jurisdictions, undermining the uniformity essential to effective national foreign policy, creating confusion for companies doing business locally, and threatening national interests.

29. Such effects are sufficient to trigger preemption regardless of the municipality's stated intent or the Ordinance's facial scope as a local fiscal measure.

30. Federal courts have repeatedly rejected attempts to recharacterize foreign-policy measures as ordinary procurement or investment decisions where the operative criteria are geopolitical or ideological.

31. Accordingly, the ordinance is preempted by federal law and unenforceable under the Supremacy Clause.

State Preemption and Breach of Fiduciary Duty

32. Massachusetts municipalities possess only those powers expressly granted by statutes and necessarily implied therefrom, or those essential to the municipality's declared objectives and purposes.

33. Where the State Legislature has enacted a comprehensive statutory scheme, municipal action in the same field is preempted.

34. Massachusetts state law strictly governs municipal finance and investments, including but not limited to: (i) G.L. c. 44, §§ 53, 55, 55B, which comprehensively regulate City use, disposition, an investment of funds, requiring,

among other things, prudent investment to achieve the highest interest reasonably available, considering safety, liquidity, and yield; (ii) G.L. c. 44, § 54, imposing additional restrictions on trust funds; and (iii) G.L. c. 32 and c. 32B, imposing fiduciary duties on public fund managers.

35. The State Legislature's regulatory framework governs custody of municipal funds; identity of lawful depositories; conditions under which municipal funds may be deposited, and the fiduciary responsibilities of the municipal treasurer

36. The statutory scheme also provides for statutory safeguards and security requirements and assigns exclusive responsibility for deposit and safekeeping of municipal funds to the municipal treasurer, subject to state law and audit.

37. These statutes do not authorize municipalities to impose categorical, non-financial divestment mandates.

38. The Ordinance is preempted as it attempts to add substantive eligibility criteria for City investments and deposits not found in state law, by forcing divestment from institutions that remain lawful for investment under state law.

39. Additionally, the Ordinance seizes authority from the treasurer to handle deposits and investments of municipal funds as required by § 55, and reallocates that power to the municipal legislative body. The Ordinance thus

conflicts with the fiduciary and custodial duties on the municipal treasurer, and exposes the treasurer to liability for mismanagement of public funds.

40. The Ordinance imprudently and illegally, in violation of the City's fiduciary duties, place municipal funds at risk by (i) dangerously, artificially restricting diversification; (ii) eliminating otherwise lawful and prudent investment options; (iii) subordinating financial criteria to political or moral judgments; and (iv) exposing the municipality to increased volatility and foregone returns.

41. Municipal treasurers and public fund managers act as fiduciaries and are held to strict duties of care, prudence, and loyalty in safeguarding and investing public funds.

42. Municipal treasurers are considered fiduciaries who must manage public funds with the highest standard of care. This involves acting solely in the interest of the public and safeguarding assets.

43. Treasurers must use the care, skill, prudence, and diligence that an "ordinarily prudent person" in a similar position would exercise. This includes diversifying investments to minimize the risk of large losses.

44. The Ordinance places the municipal treasurer in an untenable and legally perilous position. By compelling the treasurer to make investment and depository decisions that conflict with state-law prudence standards, the Ordinance exposes the treasurer to potential personal surcharge, audit findings, and civil

liability for breach of statutory fiduciary duties. Compliance with the Ordinance therefore risks personal and professional liability for the treasurer, while noncompliance risks municipal enforcement, an irreconcilable conflict created by the City's unlawful action.

45. The Ordinance inflicts irreparable harm by forcing municipal fiduciaries to choose between violating binding state fiduciary law and violating the Ordinance. This type of forced statutory conflict, exposure to personal liability, and compelled unlawful conduct constitutes irreparable harm that cannot be remedied by money damages.

46. Deprivation of statutory investment authority and interference with the treasurer's exclusive statutory powers constitutes irreparable harm as a matter of law, because it strips state-created rights and duties that cannot be restored retroactively.

47. The forced elimination of lawful, diversified investment options and the compelled concentration of municipal funds in a narrower pool of depositories causes ongoing structural harm to the City's investment program, increasing risk and reducing diversification in ways that cannot be undone after the fact.

48. The Ordinance is therefore preempted by both federal and state law.

49. The Ordinance is also ultra vires, invalid, and unenforceable.

50. The balance of equities overwhelmingly favors immediate injunctive relief. Absent an injunction, municipal fiduciaries will be compelled to violate

binding state-law duties on an ongoing basis, exposing both public officials and public funds to irreparable legal and financial harm. The public interest strongly favors halting enforcement of an unlawful ordinance and preserving the integrity of uniform statewide investment standards designed to protect public monies.

CLAIMS FOR RELIEF

COUNT I

Ultra Vires Municipal Action (G.L. c. 43B; Mass. Const. art. LXXXIX)

51. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each of the foregoing allegations with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth herein.

52. Municipalities possess only those powers conferred by statute or consistent with statute.

53. No Massachusetts statute authorizes municipalities to mandate divestment based on political, moral, or ideological criteria.

54. The Ordinance exceeds municipal authority and is void ab initio.

COUNT II

Violation of Massachusetts Investment Statutes (G.L. c. 44, §§ 54, 55B)

55. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each of the foregoing allegations with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth herein.

56. Section 55B requires municipal officials to invest prudently to obtain the highest reasonable return considering safety, liquidity, and yield.

57. The Ordinance mandates exclusions unrelated to these statutory criteria.

58. Compliance with the Ordinance necessarily conflicts with statutory investment duties.

COUNT III

Breach of Fiduciary Duty / Unlawful Interference with Fiduciary Duties (G.L. c. 32; c. 32B § 20)

59. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each of the foregoing allegations with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth herein.

60. Municipal officials and trustees are fiduciaries subject to strict prudent-investor standards.

61. The Ordinance pressures or compels fiduciaries to act for non-financial purposes, contrary to their statutory obligations.

62. Such interference is unlawful and exposes fiduciaries and the municipality to liability.

COUNT IV

Federal Preemption – Supremacy Clause (U.S. Const. art. VI)

63. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each of the foregoing allegations with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth herein.

64. The Ordinance targets conduct with substantial foreign policy implications, including alleged “human rights violations” abroad.

65. Under *Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council*, state and local divestment regimes that interfere with federal foreign policy are preempted.

66. The Ordinance intrudes into an area reserved exclusively to the federal government.

COUNT V

State-Law Preemption & Ultra Vires Municipal Divestment (G.L. c. 44, § 54)

67. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each of the foregoing allegations with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth herein.

68. G.L. c. 44 establishes a comprehensive and mandatory scheme governing the custody of municipal funds; the identity of lawful depositories; the conditions under which municipal funds may be deposited; and the fiduciary responsibilities of the municipal treasurer.

69. The statutory scheme further requires that all municipal funds be deposited only with lawful depositories authorized by state law; deposits be made in the name of the municipality; and deposits be subject to statutory safeguards and security requirements.

70. The statute assigns exclusive responsibility for deposit and safekeeping of municipal funds to the municipal treasurer, subject to state law and audit.

71. The municipality adopted an Ordinance requiring divestment from, or refusal to deposit funds with, certain financial institutions based on non-financial or ideological criteria; and/or mandatory withdrawal of funds from otherwise lawful depositories.

72. The Ordinance does not account for safety, liquidity, or yield and seeks to inject unauthorized criteria with respect to the statutory eligibility of an investment vehicle under state law.

73. G.L. c. 44 occupies the field of municipal custody and deposit of public funds, and investment of municipal funds.

74. The Ordinance conflicts with G.L. c. 44 by adding substantive eligibility criteria for depositories not found in state law; reallocating authority from the treasurer to the legislative body; and forcing divestment from institutions that remain lawful under state statute.

75. The Ordinance places municipal officers in an untenable position by requiring violation of state law and exposure to personal liability for mismanagement of public funds.

76. Such interference with statutorily assigned duties independently renders the ordinance unlawful.

77. The Ordinance is therefore ultra vires, invalid, and unenforceable.

COUNT VI
Void for Vagueness and Arbitrary Enforcement (Mass. Const.; U.S. Const.
amend. XIV)

78. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each of the foregoing allegations with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth herein.

79. The Ordinance fails to define key operative terms with objective standards.

80. It invites arbitrary, inconsistent, and politically motivated enforcement.

81. The Ordinance therefore violates due process.

COUNT VII
Federal Declaratory Judgment Act
(28 U.S.C. § 2201)

82. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each of the foregoing allegations with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth herein.

83. An actual controversy exists concerning the legality and enforceability of the Ordinance.

84. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the Ordinance is unlawful and unenforceable.

COUNT VIII
Massachusetts Declaratory Judgment Act)
(G.L. c. 231A)

85. Plaintiffs repeat and reallege each of the foregoing allegations with the same force and effect as if more fully set forth herein.

86. An actual controversy exists concerning the legality and enforceability of the Ordinance.

87. Plaintiffs seek a declaration that the Ordinance is unlawful and unenforceable.

PRAYER FOR RELIEF

WHEREFORE, Plaintiff respectfully requests that this Court:

- A. Declare the Ordinance invalid, ultra vires, and unenforceable;
- B. Enjoin Defendants from implementing or enforcing the Ordinance;
- C. Grant preliminary and permanent injunctive relief; and
- D. Award Plaintiffs costs and such other relief as the Court deems just and proper.

Respectfully submitted;

/s/ Douglas S. Brooks

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Dated: February 6, 2026

*admission *pro hac vice* forthcoming

CIVIL COVER SHEET

The JS 44 civil cover sheet and the information contained herein neither replace nor supplement the filing and service of pleadings or other papers as required by law, except as provided by local rules of court. This form, approved by the Judicial Conference of the United States in September 1974, is required for the use of the Clerk of Court for the purpose of initiating the civil docket sheet. (SEE INSTRUCTIONS ON NEXT PAGE OF THIS FORM.)

I. (a) PLAINTIFFS

Zachary R. Chertok, Eliot Jokelson, residents and taxpayers of the City of Medford

(b) County of Residence of First Listed Plaintiff _____
(EXCEPT IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES)

(c) Attorneys (Firm Name, Address, and Telephone Number)

Douglas S. Brooks (BBO No. 636697)
Libby Hoopes Brooks & Mulvey
260 Franklin Street,
Boston, MA 02110

DEFENDANTS

City of Medford, Medford City Council, Breanna Lungo-Koehn, in their official capacities

County of Residence of First Listed Defendant **Middlesex**
(IN U.S. PLAINTIFF CASES ONLY)

NOTE: IN LAND CONDEMNATION CASES, USE THE LOCATION OF THE TRACT OF LAND INVOLVED.

Attorneys (If Known)

II. BASIS OF JURISDICTION (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

- ☐ 1 U.S. Government Plaintiff
- ☒ 3 Federal Question
(U.S. Government Not a Party)
- ☐ 2 U.S. Government Defendant
- ☐ 4 Diversity
(Indicate Citizenship of Parties in Item III)

III. CITIZENSHIP OF PRINCIPAL PARTIES (Place an "X" in One Box for Plaintiff and One Box for Defendant)

- | | PTF | DEF | | PTF | DEF |
|---|---------------------------------------|---------------------------------------|---|----------------------------|----------------------------|
| Citizen of This State | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 1 | <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 1 | Incorporated or Principal Place of Business In This State | <input type="checkbox"/> 4 | <input type="checkbox"/> 4 |
| Citizen of Another State | <input type="checkbox"/> 2 | <input type="checkbox"/> 2 | Incorporated and Principal Place of Business In Another State | <input type="checkbox"/> 5 | <input type="checkbox"/> 5 |
| Citizen or Subject of a Foreign Country | <input type="checkbox"/> 3 | <input type="checkbox"/> 3 | Foreign Nation | <input type="checkbox"/> 6 | <input type="checkbox"/> 6 |

IV. NATURE OF SUIT (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

Click here for: [Nature of Suit Code Descriptions.](#)

CONTRACT	TORTS	FORFEITURE/PENALTY	BANKRUPTCY	OTHER STATUTES
<input type="checkbox"/> 110 Insurance	PERSONAL INJURY	<input type="checkbox"/> 625 Drug Related Seizure of Property 21 USC 881	<input type="checkbox"/> 422 Appeal 28 USC 158	<input type="checkbox"/> 375 False Claims Act
<input type="checkbox"/> 120 Marine	<input type="checkbox"/> 310 Airplane	<input type="checkbox"/> 690 Other	<input type="checkbox"/> 423 Withdrawal 28 USC 157	<input type="checkbox"/> 376 Qui Tam (31 USC 3729(a))
<input type="checkbox"/> 130 Miller Act	<input type="checkbox"/> 315 Airplane Product Liability		INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS	<input type="checkbox"/> 400 State Reapportionment
<input type="checkbox"/> 140 Negotiable Instrument	<input type="checkbox"/> 320 Assault, Libel & Slander		<input type="checkbox"/> 820 Copyrights	<input type="checkbox"/> 410 Antitrust
<input type="checkbox"/> 150 Recovery of Overpayment & Enforcement of Judgment	<input type="checkbox"/> 330 Federal Employers' Liability		<input type="checkbox"/> 830 Patent	<input type="checkbox"/> 430 Banks and Banking
<input type="checkbox"/> 151 Medicare Act	<input type="checkbox"/> 340 Marine		<input type="checkbox"/> 835 Patent - Abbreviated New Drug Application	<input type="checkbox"/> 450 Commerce
<input type="checkbox"/> 152 Recovery of Defaulted Student Loans (Excludes Veterans)	<input type="checkbox"/> 345 Marine Product Liability		<input type="checkbox"/> 840 Trademark	<input type="checkbox"/> 460 Deportation
<input type="checkbox"/> 153 Recovery of Overpayment of Veteran's Benefits	PERSONAL PROPERTY	LABOR	<input type="checkbox"/> 880 Defend Trade Secrets Act of 2016	<input type="checkbox"/> 470 Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations
<input type="checkbox"/> 160 Stockholders' Suits	<input type="checkbox"/> 350 Motor Vehicle	<input type="checkbox"/> 710 Fair Labor Standards Act	SOCIAL SECURITY	<input type="checkbox"/> 480 Consumer Credit (15 USC 1681 or 1692)
<input type="checkbox"/> 190 Other Contract	<input type="checkbox"/> 355 Motor Vehicle Product Liability	<input type="checkbox"/> 720 Labor/Management Relations	<input type="checkbox"/> 861 HIA (1395ff)	<input type="checkbox"/> 485 Telephone Consumer Protection Act
<input type="checkbox"/> 195 Contract Product Liability	<input type="checkbox"/> 360 Other Personal Injury	<input type="checkbox"/> 740 Railway Labor Act	<input type="checkbox"/> 862 Black Lung (923)	<input type="checkbox"/> 490 Cable/Sat TV
<input type="checkbox"/> 196 Franchise	<input type="checkbox"/> 362 Personal Injury - Medical Malpractice	<input type="checkbox"/> 751 Family and Medical Leave Act	<input type="checkbox"/> 863 DIWC/DIWW (405(g))	<input type="checkbox"/> 850 Securities/Commodities/Exchange
			<input type="checkbox"/> 864 SSID Title XVI	<input type="checkbox"/> 890 Other Statutory Actions
			<input type="checkbox"/> 865 RSI (405(g))	
REAL PROPERTY	CIVIL RIGHTS	PRISONER PETITIONS	FEDERAL TAX SUITS	<input type="checkbox"/> 891 Agricultural Acts
<input type="checkbox"/> 210 Land Condemnation	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 440 Other Civil Rights	Habeas Corpus:	<input type="checkbox"/> 870 Taxes (U.S. Plaintiff or Defendant)	<input type="checkbox"/> 893 Environmental Matters
<input type="checkbox"/> 220 Foreclosure	<input type="checkbox"/> 441 Voting	<input type="checkbox"/> 463 Alien Detainee	<input type="checkbox"/> 871 IRS—Third Party 26 USC 7609	<input type="checkbox"/> 895 Freedom of Information Act
<input type="checkbox"/> 230 Rent Lease & Ejectment	<input type="checkbox"/> 442 Employment	<input type="checkbox"/> 510 Motions to Vacate Sentence		<input type="checkbox"/> 896 Arbitration
<input type="checkbox"/> 240 Torts to Land	<input type="checkbox"/> 443 Housing/ Accommodations	<input type="checkbox"/> 530 General		<input type="checkbox"/> 899 Administrative Procedure Act/Review or Appeal of Agency Decision
<input type="checkbox"/> 245 Tort Product Liability	<input type="checkbox"/> 445 Amer. w/Disabilities - Employment	<input type="checkbox"/> 535 Death Penalty		<input type="checkbox"/> 950 Constitutionality of State Statutes
<input type="checkbox"/> 290 All Other Real Property	<input type="checkbox"/> 446 Amer. w/Disabilities - Other	Other:		
	<input type="checkbox"/> 448 Education	<input type="checkbox"/> 540 Mandamus & Other	IMMIGRATION	
		<input type="checkbox"/> 550 Civil Rights	<input type="checkbox"/> 462 Naturalization Application	
		<input type="checkbox"/> 555 Prison Condition	<input type="checkbox"/> 465 Other Immigration Actions	
		<input type="checkbox"/> 560 Civil Detainee - Conditions of Confinement		

V. ORIGIN (Place an "X" in One Box Only)

- ☒ 1 Original Proceeding
- ☐ 2 Removed from State Court
- ☐ 3 Remanded from Appellate Court
- ☐ 4 Reinstated or Reopened
- ☐ 5 Transferred from Another District (specify)
- ☐ 6 Multidistrict Litigation - Transfer
- ☐ 8 Multidistrict Litigation - Direct File

VI. CAUSE OF ACTION

Cite the U.S. Civil Statute under which you are filing (Do not cite jurisdictional statutes unless diversity):
28 U.S.C. § 1331(a)(2)

Brief description of cause:

Federal preemption; state preemption; breach of fiduciary duty

VII. REQUESTED IN COMPLAINT:

☐ CHECK IF THIS IS A CLASS ACTION UNDER RULE 23, F.R.Cv.P.

DEMAND \$

CHECK YES only if demanded in complaint:

JURY DEMAND: ☐ Yes ☒ No

VIII. RELATED CASE(S) IF ANY

(See instructions):

JUDGE

DOCKET NUMBER

DATE

SIGNATURE OF ATTORNEY OF RECORD

02/06/2026

FOR OFFICE USE ONLY

RECEIPT # _____ AMOUNT _____ APPLYING IFP _____ JUDGE _____ MAG. JUDGE _____

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS1. Title of case (name of first party on each side only) Zachary R. Chertok v. City of Medford

2. Category in which the case belongs based upon the numbered nature of suit code listed on the civil cover sheet. (See local rule 40.1(a)(1)).

☐

I. 160, 400, 410, 441, 535, 830*, 835*, 850, 880, 891, 893, R.23, REGARDLESS OF NATURE OF SUIT.

☒

II. 110, 130, 190, 196, 370, 375, 376, 440, 442, 443, 445, 446, 448, 470, 751, 820*, 840*, 895, 896, 899.

☐

III. 120, 140, 150, 151, 152, 153, 195, 210, 220, 230, 240, 245, 290, 310, 315, 320, 330, 340, 345, 350, 355, 360, 362, 365, 367, 368, 371, 380, 385, 422, 423, 430, 450, 460, 462, 463, 465, 480, 485, 490, 510, 530, 540, 550, 555, 560, 625, 690, 710, 720, 740, 790, 791, 861-865, 870, 871, 890, 950.

*Also complete AO 120 or AO 121. for patent, trademark or copyright cases.

3. Title and number, if any, of related cases. (See local rule 40.1(g)). If more than one prior related case has been filed in this district please indicate the title and number of the first filed case in this court.

None

4. Has a prior action between the same parties and based on the same claim ever been filed in this court?

YES

☐

NO

☒

5. Does the complaint in this case question the constitutionality of an act of congress affecting the public interest? (See 28 USC §2403)

YES

☐

NO

☒

If so, is the U.S.A. or an officer, agent or employee of the U.S. a party?

YES

☐

NO

☒

6. Is this case required to be heard and determined by a district court of three judges pursuant to title 28 USC §2284?

YES

☐

NO

☒7. Do all of the parties in this action, excluding governmental agencies of the United States and the Commonwealth of Massachusetts ("governmental agencies"), residing in Massachusetts reside in the same division? - (See Local Rule 40.1(d)).

YES

☒

NO

☐A. If yes, in which division do all of the non-governmental parties reside?

Eastern Division

☒

Central Division

☐

Western Division

☐

B. If no, in which division do the majority of the plaintiffs or the only parties, excluding governmental agencies, residing in Massachusetts reside?

Eastern Division

☐

Central Division

☐

Western Division

☐

8. If filing a Notice of Removal - are there any motions pending in the state court requiring the attention of this Court? (If yes, submit a separate sheet identifying the motions)

YES

☐

NO

☒

(PLEASE TYPE OR PRINT)

ATTORNEY'S NAME Douglas S. BrooksADDRESS 260 Franklin Street, Boston, MA 02110TELEPHONE NO. 617/338-9300